The original design was never certifiable, but I didn’t believe the evolved airplane was, either. And that was for an incomplete airplane lacking many basic functions and it would have cost many thousands more per airplane to eventually modify them to match the sales contract.īut I was wrong about the Eclipse 500 chances for certification. It was costing the company more than twice as much to build an Eclipse 500 as it had sold the airplane for. The company also predicted impossibly low empty weights, which then led to unattainable performance and range predictions, and it expected to accomplish all of this in record setting time.īut Eclipse is, at its root, a financial failure first and foremost. And anybody who took delivery of the 260 or so airplanes to leave the factory has lost all warranties and the promises to modify the airplane to a final and usable status.Ī disaster of this size has many causes, but the most fundamental was a fantasy about the economics of designing, building and supporting airplanes. Anybody who had a deposit for an airplane lost the money. Eclipse investors have lost hundreds of millions, but individuals are also big losers.
There has never been a financial failure of this scale in the entire history of general aviation. In late November Eclipse Aviation filed for bankruptcy, and investors, suppliers, Eclipse 500 owners and order holders lost well over $1 billion.
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